Although the Arab-Islamic Summit to be held in Doha on Monday morning, September 15, 2025, will not live up to the expectations of the Arab and Islamic peoples who were waiting for an Arab-Islamic decision to expel diplomats and workers and completely sever relations with the Zionist entity after it attacked an Arab and Islamic country. However, the draft of the final statement that we read on some websites did not go beyond expressions of condemnation and rejection, which are cheaper than the ink and paper on which they were printed, without any practical response to the global evil trio of the Zionist entity, Britain, which fueled Israeli planes to fly over Doha, and America. Yesterday, we saw US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, that inexperienced man, visiting the Zionist entity and brazenly telling their media that their relationship with that bastard entity would not be affected by any event, meaning what happened recently in Doha. Instead of offering a formal apology for his country’s actions, were it not for the money of countries such as Qatar, especially with Trump’s visit to Riyadh and his securing of $2.1 trillion in cash and partnership agreements worth billions last May, would have declared bankruptcy long ago. This called for the revival of the previous Egyptian proposal put forward by President Sisi at the Arab Summit in Sharm El Sheikh in 2015 to establish joint Arab forces to maintain Arab national security. I would like to thank Mr. Mohamed Gomaa, a journalist at Radio Sputnik, for hosting me and asking the following important questions about this Egyptian proposal and its effectiveness in such circumstances.

Cairo is reviving President Sisi’s initiative (joint Arab forces) after the attack on Qatar… How do you interpret the Arab anger sweeping the region following Israel’s sole attack on Qatar, which we did not see during the devastating Israeli raids on Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen?

The stark contrast between the collective Arab reaction to the Israeli strikes on Qatar and the relative silence during the devastating raids on Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen is not a measure of Arab anger so much as it is a strategic calculation rooted in political realism and divergent national interests. The revival of the proposed Arab joint force initiative, although it comes in the context of solidarity, is essentially a political maneuver on the part of Cairo and its allies to take advantage of a decisive moment to reaffirm a specific regional order. The relative acceptance of Israeli actions in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen by the Gulf states was based on a complex network of factors: the sectarian dimensions of the Syrian conflict, which led to the isolation of other Arab states, as well as, from the perspective of some Gulf states, Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon, which is seen as an agent of Iran rather than a sovereign entity, and the Saudi-led coalition’s active military opposition to the Houthis in Yemen. In contrast, Qatar is a rich and influential country, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, an ally of the US, and has no problems with Israel. Violating its sovereignty represents a direct challenge to the Gulf security model and undermines the authority of established government structures. This incident provides a pretext for mobilizing a long-dormant initiative for comprehensive Arab defense against external actors such as Israel, through the imposition of a bloc-led security structure under the guise of Arab unity.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has proposed an initiative to form a collective security umbrella that would guarantee rapid military intervention in the event of an attack on any Arab country. To what extent has this met with a positive Arab response?

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s initiative to establish a collective Arab security umbrella, which envisions a NATO-like framework for mutual defense, has been met with a cautious and strategic response from regional partners, reflecting the deep complexities of Arab domestic politics. While the proposal theoretically addresses an urgent need for a unified deterrent against common external threats, particularly from Israel and extremist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their ilk, its reception has been relatively muted this time around. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, whose security is most urgently threatened and which possess the significant financial resources needed to fund such an ambitious agreement, have shown notable caution. Historically, they have preferred to conclude bilateral security agreements with global powers such as the United States, a model that provides them with greater individual influence and predictability than a multilateral union that may be difficult to control. This reluctance is compounded by ongoing geopolitical divisions, such as the current Gulf rift, which has only recently seen a temporary resolution with the Al-Ula Declaration in Saudi Arabia, and the deep reservations of many capitals about ceding any degree of national sovereignty to a collective body that may be dominated by Cairo’s leadership. Thus, while the initiative has succeeded in reviving a crucial dialogue on Arab security integration, its practical implementation remains contingent on overcoming decades of mutual distrust and reconciling divergent national security doctrines, a formidable challenge that has so far prevented any substantive, large-scale adoption beyond rhetorical support.

What are the main obstacles facing the project to establish a joint Arab force, taking into account the existing differences between Arab countries?

Although the proposal to establish a unified joint Arab force is strategically compelling given the common security challenges facing the region, it continues to face significant obstacles due to a complex web of political, ideological, and structural barriers. The most important of these obstacles is the severe lack of political will resulting from deep-rooted Arab rivalries, such as the proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in Syria, and the blockade of Qatar (2017-2021), which fuels mutual distrust and prevents consensus on a unified command structure and a common assessment of threats. Furthermore, the significant disparity in military capabilities and economic resources—where the modern arsenals and financial power of the GCC states contrast sharply with the economic difficulties of countries such as Egypt or Jordan — creates an unequal burden-sharing dilemma, raising concerns about the financing of the force, operational fairness, and the potential dominance of wealthier states. This is compounded by the absence of a coherent political framework similar to NATO’s integrated command. Furthermore, the institutional weakness inherent in the Arab League, evident in its inconsistent responses to crises from Syria to Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, and previously Iraq, renders it an ineffective vehicle for such an ambitious military endeavor. Thus, without a fundamental reconciliation between divergent national interests and foreign policy orientations—often linked to forces outside the region—the project remains more of a rhetorical ambition than a concrete security mechanism.

Could the West view this initiative as a direct hostile move against Israel, and could some powers use it as a pretext to drag the region into open military confrontation?

While the stated goal of the joint Arab force is often framed in the context of collective regional security and the fight against terrorism and regional and international threats—pointing to the common threat from actors such as terrorist groups like ISIS — its strategic implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict are undeniable and are likely to be examined through a realist lens in Western capitals. Historically, any significant consolidation of Arab military power, such as the Arab Military Command in the 1960s, has been instinctively assessed against the possibility of its deployment in a future conflict between states and Israel, a key US ally.

By Dr Ahmed Moustafa, President and owner of the Asia Center for Studies and Translation