“This note was provided to us for exclusive publication by the author and reflects his personal opinions.”

Starting from 2025 the chairmanship in the BRICS grouping is passed on to Brazil. While there may be significant continuity in the BRICS agenda compared to the past several years, there may also be novelties and new priorities set by Brazil with important implications for the medium-term trajectory of BRICS development. In the past Brazil played a palpable role in the evolution of the BRICS discussions on expansion and economic cooperation – this time around we expect a focused and pragmatic approach from Brazil in setting the priorities for BRICS economic development.

One of the factors of continuity with respect to the past several years of BRICS development may be Brazil’s decision to conduct the BRICS+ meetings/summits – as was the case in South Africa and Russia in 2023-2024. The last time Brazil chaired the BRICS grouping in 2019 Brazil’s President Bolsonaro opted for putting the BRICS+ format on ice after its launching in 2017 in China and the successful 2018 BRICS+ outreach summit in South Africa. Since 2019 the BRICS+ format was essentially on hold until 2022 when China relaunched the BRICS+ initiative. If Brazil does decide to move ahead with BRICS+ meetings in 2025, this will be the fourth consecutive year of such meetings, making the BRICS+ format more entrenched going forward.

In terms of the modalities of BRICS+ meetings, it may be expected that Brazil will invite MERCOSUR economies to take part in the BRICS+ summit. But apart from the regional Latin American focus of the BRICS outreach, there may also be a more global approach that will be accompanied by invitations being extended to other regional blocs of the Global South, such as ASEAN, as well as individual economies. The big question with respect to the BRICS+ format will be whether Brazil opts for new forms of economic cooperation among BRICS+ economies and their regional organizations, including via possibly creating a platform of cooperation among the key regional integration blocs of BRICS+ as well as their respective regional development institutions.

With the BRICS+ paradigm likely persisting and possibly even being developed further, the BRICS is set to remain in extrovert/expansion mode in 2025 after 2 years of expansion. The year 2025 will be the first to feature the participation of the new “Partnership belt” – the new circle of BRICS partners will participate in most of the key meetings, including the annual summit. There may be further steps undertaken by Brazil to expand the circle of BRICS friends after the list of the BRICS partners approved at the 2024 BRICS summit is made public at the end of the current year. But while some further motion in developing the BRICS partnership modalities may be witnessed in 2025, there is unlikely to be any major developments associated with the expansion in the BRICS core. In the coming years the focus is likely to be directed at integrating the new members of the core, with continued efforts directed at resolving the uncertainty concerning Saudi Arabia’s participation in BRICS.

In the economic sphere, further progress in developing alternative payment systems along the lines of BRICS Bridge may continue at the expert level without any breakthroughs in terms of actual initiatives being launched or tested. As for the issue of the BRICS common currency, we do not expect any significant headway beyond expert-level discussions. Throughout this year the signal coming from BRICS members has been that the issue of the payment system takes precedence over the creation of a common currency.

Within the economic realm there may be more emphasis coming from Brazil on developing the BRICS environmental policy coordination agenda – something that may dovetail Brazil’s efforts during its G20 chairmanship in 2024 as well as its chairing of the COP 30 conference in November 2025. The latter will likely also mean that Brazil will aim to front-load its BRICS initiatives and activism towards the first half of the year, while focusing more on COP 30 in the second half of the year (one sign of this is that Brazil plans to conduct the BRICS summit much earlier in the course of the year compared to the past several years of BRICS summits).

Brazil’s G20 experience in chairing the grouping may further shape its BRICS efforts next year via launching similar initiatives to the ones that were prioritized in 2024 within G20 – this pertains in particular to its G20 initiatives such as coordination among multilateral development banks (MDBs) as well as the creation of the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty as well as the “social pillar” within the G20. The BRICS initiatives that may serve to reinforce or support these global priorities may include the creation of a platform for cooperation among the MDBs/regional development banks in which BRICS countries are members as well as the further development and institutionalization of the BRICS CRA that would become a more effective tool in supporting BRICS+ economies in their efforts to achieve macroeconomic stability and reduce poverty.

The 2026 presidential elections to be held in Brazil may impact the country’s BRICS chairmanship via efforts to keep a lid on spending associated with the BRICS events and focusing BRICS initiatives on pragmatic themes that are most important for sustainable and socially-responsible development (again in line with Brazil’s earlier G20 initiatives). There may also be more scope for the 2025 chairmanship of Brazil to consider the possibilities for inviting development institutions and regional organizations/blocs with the participation of advanced economies (perhaps as part of a separate BRICS++ outreach exercise) – at this stage, however, it may be too early to predict the emergence of such a new format in BRICS outreach agenda.

Overall, Brazil’s chairmanship in BRICS will build on the headway achieved by the bloc in the preceding several years, most notably in the area of the expansion in the bloc’s “Partnership belt” as well as in the further development of the BRICS+ format. Brazil’s G20 priorities may be a useful guide in gauging the country’s agenda and key development trajectories for BRICS 2025 chairmanship. In the end, Brazil could attempt to capitalize on the streak of chairmanships in key international forums and conferences such as COP, BRICS and G20 via building linkages among the priorities that it includes into these forums’ agenda, thus raising the momentum and likelihood of the attainment of the goals and priorities that it sets forth on the international stage.

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Yaroslav Lissovolik worked in the International Monetary Fund, in Washington, where he was Advisor to the Executive Director for the Russian Federation (2001–2004). In 2004 he joined Deutsche Bank as Chief Economist and became Head of Company Research in Russia in 2009, and then a member of the Management Board of Deutsche Bank in Russia in 2011. In 2015–2018 Yaroslav Lissovolik was Chief Economist and subsequently Managing Director of Research and Member of the Management Board at the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB). Since 2018 he has been Senior Managing Director — Head of Research at Sberbank Investment Research (CIB). He is also a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), Bretton Woods Committee and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Member of the Global Advisory Council, National Academy of Belt and Road Green Development, China. Senior member of the Advisory Council at the Center for Russia-China Strategic Cooperation of the CITIC Foundation on reform and development. Member of the Committee on Financial Stability with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. He has published books on the Russia’s entry to the WTO and Russia’s integration into the world economy, as well as numerous articles and papers on economic and policy issues.